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Abstract
Background: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions
that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our
consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not
by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much
less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine
what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute
specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition?
Presentation of the hypothesis: This paper presents a theory about what consciousness is and
how it can be measured. According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a
system to integrate information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological properties
of consciousness: differentiation – the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences;
and integration – the unity of each such experience. The theory states that the quantity of
consciousness available to a system can be measured as the Φ value of a complex of elements. Φ
is the amount of causally effective information that can be integrated across the informational
weakest link of a subset of elements. A complex is a subset of elements with Φ>0 that is not part
of a subset of higher Φ. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is determined by
the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which are specified by the values
of effective information among them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by
the value, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational interactions among the
elements of a complex.
Testing the hypothesis: The information integration theory accounts, in a principled manner,
for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown here, these include
the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that
neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that
remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized
seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness.
Implications of the hypothesis: The theory entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity,
that it is graded, that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible to build
conscious artifacts.
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Background
Consciousness is everything we experience. Think of it as
what abandons us every night when we fall into dreamless
sleep and returns the next morning when we wake up [1].
Without consciousness, as far as we are concerned, there
would be neither an external world nor our own selves:
there would be nothing at all. To understand conscious-
ness, two main problems need to be addressed. [2,3]. The
first problem is to understand the conditions that deter-
mine to what extent a system has consciousness. For
example, why is it that certain parts of the brain are impor-
tant for conscious experience, whereas others, equally rich
in neurons and connections, are not? And why are we con-
scious during wakefulness or dreaming sleep, but much
less so during dreamless sleep, even if the brain remains
highly active? The second problem is to understand the con-
ditions that determine what kind of consciousness a sys-
tem has. For example, what determines the specific and
seemingly irreducible quality of the different modalities
(e.g. vision, audition, pain), submodalities (e.g. visual
color and motion), and dimensions (e.g. blue and red)
that characterize our conscious experience? Why do colors
look the way they do, and different from the way music
sounds, or pain feels? Solving the first problem means
that we would know to what extent a physical system can
generate consciousness – the quantity  or level of con-
sciousness. Solving the second problem means that we
would know what kind of consciousness it generates – the
quality or content of consciousness.
Presentation of the hypothesis
The first problem: What determines to what extent a 
system has conscious experience?
We all know that our own consciousness waxes when we
awaken and wanes when we fall asleep. We may also
know first-hand that we can "lose consciousness" after
receiving a blow on the head, or after taking certain drugs,
such as general anesthetics. Thus, everyday experience
indicates that consciousness has a physical substrate, and
that that physical substrate must be working in the proper
way for us to be fully conscious. It also prompts us to ask,
more generally, what may be the conditions that deter-
mine to what extent consciousness is present. For exam-
ple, are newborn babies conscious, and to what extent?
Are animals conscious? If so, are some animals more con-
scious than others? And can they feel pain? Can a con-
scious artifact be constructed with non-neural
ingredients? Is a person with akinetic mutism – awake
with eyes open, but mute, immobile, and nearly unre-
sponsive – conscious or not? And how much conscious-
ness is there during sleepwalking or psychomotor
seizures? It would seem that, to address these questions
and obtain a genuine understanding of consciousness,
empirical studies must be complemented by a theoretical
analysis.
Consciousness as information integration
The theory presented here claims that consciousness has
to do with the capacity to integrate information. This
claim may not seem self-evident, perhaps because, being
endowed with consciousness for most of our existence, we
take it for granted. To gain some perspective, it is useful to
resort to some thought experiments that illustrate key
properties of subjective experience: its informativeness, its
unity, and its spatio-temporal scale.
Information
Consider the following thought experiment. You are fac-
ing a blank screen that is alternately on and off, and you
have been instructed to say "light" when the screen turns
on and "dark" when it turns off. A photodiode – a very
simple light-sensitive device – has also been placed in
front of the screen, and is set up to beep when the screen
emits light and to stay silent when the screen does not.
The first problem of consciousness boils down to this.
When you differentiate between the screen being on or
off, you have the conscious experience of "seeing" light or
dark. The photodiode can also differentiate between the
screen being on or off, but presumably it does not con-
sciously "see" light and dark. What is the key difference
between you and the photodiode that makes you "see"
light consciously? (see Appendix, i)
According to the theory, the key difference between you
and the photodiode has to do with how much information
is generated when that differentiation is made. Informa-
tion is classically defined as reduction of uncertainty
among a number of alternatives outcomes when one of
them occurs [4]. It can be measured by the entropy func-
tion, which is the weighted sum of the logarithm of the
probability (p) of alternatives outcomes (i): H = -
Σpilog2pi. Thus, tossing a fair coin and obtaining heads
corresponds to 1 bit of information, because there are just
two alternatives; throwing a fair die yields log2(6) ≈ 2.59
bits of information, because there are six equally likely
alternatives (H decreases if some of the outcomes are
more likely than others, as would be the case with a
loaded die).
When the blank screen turns on, the photodiode enters
one of its two possible alternative states and beeps. As
with the coin, this corresponds to 1 bit of information.
However, when you see the blank screen turn on, the state
you enter, unlike the photodiode, is one out of an extraor-
dinarily large number of possible states. That is, the pho-
todiode's repertoire is minimally differentiated, while
yours is immensely so. It is not difficult to see this. For
example, imagine that, instead of turning homogeneously
on, the screen were to display at random every frame from
every movie that was or could ever be produced. Without
any effort, each of these frames would cause you to enterBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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a different state and "see" a different image. This means
that when you enter the particular state ("seeing light")
you rule out not just "dark", but an extraordinarily large
number of alternative possibilities. Whether you think or
not of the bewildering number of alternatives (and you
typically don't), this corresponds to an extraordinary
amount of information (see Appendix, ii). This point is so
simple that its importance has been overlooked.
Integration
While the ability to differentiate among a very large
number of states is a major difference between you and
the lowly photodiode, by itself it is not enough to account
for the presence of conscious experience. To see why, con-
sider an idealized one megapixel digital camera, whose
sensor chip is essentially a collection of one million pho-
todiodes. Even if each photodiode in the sensor chip were
just binary, the camera as such could differentiate among
21,000,000 states, an immense number, corresponding to
1,000,000 bits of information. Indeed, the camera would
easily enter a different state for every frame from every
movie that was or could ever be produced. Yet nobody
would believe that the camera is conscious. What is the
key difference between you and the camera?
According to the theory, the key difference between you
and the camera has to do with information integration.
From the perspective of an external observer, the camera
chip can certainly enter a very large number of different
states, as could easily be demonstrated by presenting it
with all possible input signals. However, the sensor chip
can be considered just as well as a collection of one mil-
lion photodiodes with a repertoire of two states each,
rather than as a single integrated system with a repertoire
of 21,000,000 states. This is because, due to the absence of
interactions among the photodiodes within the sensory
chip, the state of each element is causally independent of
that of the other elements, and no information can be
integrated among them. Indeed, if the sensor chip were lit-
erally cut down into its individual photodiodes, the per-
formance of the camera would not change at all.
By contrast, the repertoire of states available to you cannot
be subdivided into the repertoire of states available to
independent components. This is because, due to the
multitude of causal interactions among the elements of
your brain, the state of each element is causally dependent
on that of other elements, which is why information can
be integrated among them. Indeed, unlike disconnecting
the photodiodes in a camera sensor, disconnecting the
elements of your brain that underlie consciousness has
disastrous effects. The integration of information in con-
scious experience is evident phenomenologically: when
you consciously "see" a certain image, that image is expe-
rienced as an integrated whole and cannot be subdivided
into component images that are experienced independ-
ently. For example, no matter how hard you try, for exam-
ple, you cannot experience colors independent of shapes,
or the left half of the visual field of view independently of
the right half. And indeed, the only way to do so is to
physically split the brain in two to prevent information
integration between the two hemispheres. But then, such
split-brain operations yield two separate subjects of con-
scious experience, each of them having a smaller reper-
toire of available states and more limited performance [5].
Spatio-temporal characteristics
Finally, it is important to appreciate that conscious expe-
rience unfolds at a characteristic spatio-temporal scale.
For instance, it flows in time at a characteristic speed and
cannot be much faster or much slower. No matter how
hard you try, you cannot speed up experience to follow a
move accelerated a hundred times, not can you slow it
down if the movie has decelerated. Studies of how a per-
cept is progressively specified and stabilized – a process
called microgenesis – indicate that it takes up to 100–200
milliseconds to develop a fully formed sensory experi-
ence, and that the surfacing of a conscious thought may
take even longer [6]. In fact, the emergence of a visual per-
cept is somewhat similar to the developing of a photo-
graphic print: first there is just the awareness that
something has changed, then that it is something visual
rather than, say, auditory, later some elementary features
become apparent, such as motion, localization, and
rough size, then colors and shapes emerge, followed by
the formation of a full object and its recognition – a
sequence that clearly goes from less to more differentiated
[6]. Other evidence indicates that a single conscious
moment does not extend beyond 2–3 seconds [7]. While
it is arguable whether conscious experience unfolds more
akin to a series of discrete snapshots or to a continuous
flow, its time scale is certainly comprised between these
lower and upper limits. Thus, a phenomenological analy-
sis indicates that consciousness has to do with the ability
to integrate a large amount of information, and that such
integration occurs at a characteristic spatio-temporal
scale.
Measuring the capacity to integrate information: The Φ of a complex
If consciousness corresponds to the capacity to integrate
information, then a physical system should be able to
generate consciousness to the extent that it has a large rep-
ertoire of available states (information), yet it cannot be
decomposed into a collection of causally independent
subsystems (integration). How can one identify such an
integrated system, and how can one measure its repertoire
of available states [2,8]?
As was mentioned above, to measure the repertoire of
states that are available to a system, one can use theBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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entropy function, but this way of measuring information
is completely insensitive to whether the information is
integrated. Thus, measuring entropy would not allow us
to distinguish between one million photodiodes with a
repertoire of two states each, and a single integrated sys-
tem with a repertoire of 21,000,000 states. To measure infor-
mation integration, it is essential to know whether a set of
elements constitute a causally integrated system, or they
can be broken down into a number of independent or
quasi-independent subsets among which no information
can be integrated.
To see how one can achieve this goal, consider an
extremely simplified system constituted of a set of ele-
ments. To make matters slightly more concrete, assume
that we are dealing with a neural system. Each element
could represent, for instance, a group of locally intercon-
nected neurons that share inputs and outputs, such as a
cortical minicolumn. Assume further that each element
can go through discrete activity states, corresponding to
different firing levels, each of which lasts for a few hun-
dred milliseconds. Finally, for the present purposes, let us
imagine that the system is disconnected from external
inputs, just as the brain is virtually disconnected from the
environment when it is dreaming.
Effective information
Consider now a subset S of elements taken from such a
system, and the diagram of causal interactions among
them (Fig. 1a). We want to measure the information gen-
erated when S enters a particular state out of its repertoire,
but only to the extent that such information can be inte-
grated, i.e. each state results from causal interactions
within the system. How can one do so? One way is to
divide S into two complementary parts A and B, and eval-
uate the responses of B that can be caused by all possible
inputs originating from A. In neural terms, we try out all
possible combinations of firing patterns as outputs from
A, and establish how differentiated is the repertoire of fir-
ing patterns they produce in B. In information-theoretical
terms, we give maximum entropy to the outputs from A
(AHmax), i.e. we substitute its elements with independent
noise sources, and we determine the entropy of the
responses of B that can be induced by inputs from A. Spe-
cifically, we define the effective information between A and
B as EI(A→B) = MI(AHmax;B). Here MI(A;B) = H(A) + H(B)
- H(AB) stands for mutual information, a measure of the
entropy or information shared between a source (A) and
a target (B). Note that since A is substituted by independ-
ent noise sources, there are no causal effects of B on A;
therefore the entropy shared by B and A is necessarily due
to causal effects of A on B. Moreover, EI(A→B) measures
all possible effects of A on B, not just those that are
observed if the system were left to itself. Also, EI(A→B)
and EI(B→A) in general are not symmetric. Finally, note
that the value of EI(A→B) is bounded by AHmax and BHmax,
whichever is less. In summary, to measure EI(B→A), one
needs to apply maximum entropy to the outputs from B,
and determine the entropy of the responses of B that are
induced by inputs from A. It should be apparent from the
definition that EI(A→B) will be high if the connections
between A and B are strong and specialized, such that dif-
ferent outputs from A will induce different firing patterns
in B. On the other hand, EI(A→B) will be low or zero if
the connections between A and B are such that different
outputs from A produce scarce effects, or if the effect is
always the same. For a given bipartition of a subset, then,
the sum of the effective information for both directions is
indicated as EI(A   B) = EI(A→B) + EI(B→A). Thus, EI(A
 B) measures the repertoire of possible causal effects of
A on B and of B on A.
Information integration
Based on the notion of effective information for a biparti-
tion, we can assess how much information can be inte-
grated within a system of elements. To this end, we note
that a subset S of elements cannot integrate any informa-
tion (as a subset) if there is a way to partition S in two
parts A and B such that EI(A   B) = 0 (Fig. 1b, vertical
bipartition). In such a case, in fact, we would clearly be
dealing with at least two causally independent subsets,
rather than with a single, integrated subset. This is exactly
what would happen with the photodiodes making up the
sensor of a digital camera: perturbing the state of some of
the photodiodes would make no difference to the state of
the others. Similarly, a subset can integrate little informa-
tion if there is a way to partition it in two parts A and B
such that EI(A   B) is low: the effective information
across that bipartition is the limiting factor on the subset's
information integration capacity. Therefore in order to
measure the information integration capacity of a subset
S, we should search for the bipartition(s) of S for which
EI(A   B) reaches a minimum (the informational "weak-
est link")." Since EI(A   B) is necessarily bounded by the
maximum entropy available to A or B, min{EI(A   B)},
to be comparable over bipartitions, should be normalized
by Hmax(A   B) = min{Hmax(A); Hmax(B)}, the maximum
information capacity for each bipartition. The minimum
information bipartition MIBA   B of subset S – its 'weakest
link' – is its bipartition for which the normalized effective
information reaches a minimum, corresponding to
min{EI(A   B)/Hmax(A   B)}. The information integra-
tion for subset S, or Φ(S), is simply the (non-normalized)
value of EI(A   B) for the minimum information bipar-
tition: Φ(S) = EI(MIBA   B). The symbol Φ is meant to
indicate that the information (the vertical bar "I") is
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Effective information, minimum information bipartition, and complexes Figure 1
Effective information, minimum information bipartition, and complexes. a. Effective information. Shown is a single 
subset S of 4 elements ({1,2,3,4}, blue circle), forming part of a larger system X (black ellipse). This subset is bisected into A 
and B by a bipartition ({1,3}/{2,4}, indicated by the dotted grey line). Arrows indicate causally effective connections linking A to 
B and B to A across the bipartition (other connections may link both A and B to the rest of the system X). To measure 
EI(A→B), maximum entropy Hmax is injected into the outgoing connections from A (corresponding to independent noise 
sources). The entropy of the states of B that is due to the input from A is then measured. Note that A can affect B directly 
through connections linking the two subsets, as well as indirectly via X. Applying maximum entropy to B allows one to measure 
EI(B→A). The effective information for this bipartition is EI(A   B) = EI(A→B) + EI(B→A). b. Minimum information bipartition. 
For subset S = {1,2,3,4}, the horizontal bipartition {1,3}/{2,4} yields a positive value of EI. However, the bipartition {1,2}/{3,4} 
yields EI = 0 and is a minimum information bipartition (MIB) for this subset. The other bipartitions of subset S = {1,2,3,4} are 
{1,4}/{2,3}, {1}/{2,3,4}, {2}/{1,3,4}, {3}/{1,2,4}, {4}/{1,2,3}, all with EI>0. c. Analysis of complexes. By considering all subsets of sys-
tem X one can identify its complexes and rank them by the respective values of Φ – the value of EI for their minimum informa-
tion bipartition. Assuming that other elements in X are disconnected, it is easy to see that Φ>0 for subset {3,4} and {1,2}, but 
Φ = 0 for subsets {1,3}, {1,4}, {2,3}, {2,4}, {1,2,3}, {1,2,4}, {1,3,4}, {2,3,4}, and {1,2,3,4}. Subsets {3,4} and {1,2} are not part of a 
larger subset having higher Φ, and therefore they constitute complexes. This is indicated schematically by having them encir-
cled by a grey oval (darker grey indicates higher Φ). Methodological note. In order to identify complexes and their Φ(S) for sys-
tems with many different connection patterns, each system X was implemented as a stationary multidimensional Gaussian 
process such that values for effective information could be obtained analytically (details in [8]). Briefly, in order to identify com-
plexes and their Φ(S) for systems with many different connection patterns, we implemented numerous model systems X com-
posed of n neural elements with connections CONij specified by a connection matrix CON(X) (no self-connections). In order 
to compare different architectures, CON(X) was normalized so that the absolute value of the sum of the afferent synaptic 
weights per element corresponded to a constant value w<1 (here w = 0.5). If the system's dynamics corresponds to a multivar-
iate Gaussian random process, its covariance matrix COV(X) can be derived analytically. As in previous work, we consider the 
vector X of random variables that represents the activity of the elements of X, subject to independent Gaussian noise R of 
magnitude c. We have that, when the elements settle under stationary conditions, X = X * CON(X) + cR. By defining Q = (1-
CON(X))-1 and averaging over the states produced by successive values of R, we obtain the covariance matrix COV(X) = 
<X*X> = <Qt * Rt * R * Q> = Qt * Q, where the superscript t refers to the transpose. Under Gaussian assumptions, all devi-
ations from independence among the two complementary parts A and B of a subset S of X are expressed by the covariances 
among the respective elements. Given these covariances, values for the individual entropies H(A) and H(B), as well as for the 
joint entropy of the subset H(S) = H(AB) can be obtained as, for example, H(A) = (1/2)ln [(2π e)n|COV(A)|], where |•| denotes 
the determinant. The mutual information between A and B is then given by MI(A;B) = H(A) + H(B) - H(AB). Note that MI(A:B) 
is symmetric and positive. To obtain the effective information between A and B within model systems, independent noise 
sources in A are enforced by setting to zero strength the connections within A and afferent to A. Then the covariance matrix 
for A is equal to the identity matrix (given independent Gaussian noise), and any statistical dependence between A and B must 
be due to the causal effects of A on B, mediated by the efferent connections of A. Moreover, all possible outputs from A that 
could affect B are evaluated. Under these conditions, EI(A→B) = MI(AHmax;B). The independent Gaussian noise R applied to A 
is multiplied by cp, the perturbation coefficient, while the independent Gaussian noise applied to the rest of the system is given 
by ci, the intrinsic noise coefficient. Here cp = 1 and ci = 0.00001 in order to emphasize the role of the connectivity and mini-
mize that of noise. To identify complexes and obtain their capacity for information integration, one considers every subset S of 
X composed of k elements, with k = 2,..., n. For each subset S, we consider all bipartitions and calculate EI(A   B) for each of 
them. We find the minimum information bipartition MIB(S), the bipartition for which the normalized effective information reaches 
a minimum, and the corresponding value of Φ(S). We then find the complexes of X as those subsets S with Φ>0 that are not 
included within a subset having higher Φ and rank them based on their Φ(S) value. The complex with the maximum value of 
Φ(S) is the main complex. MATLAB functions used for calculating effective information and complexes are at http://tononi.psy 
chiatry.wisc.edu/informationintegration/toolbox.html.
G
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Complexes
We are now in a position to establish which subsets are
actually capable of integrating information, and how
much of it (Fig. 1c). To do so, we consider every possible
subset S of m elements out of the n elements of a system,
starting with subsets of two elements (m = 2) and ending
with a subset corresponding to the entire system (m = n).
For each of them, we measure the value of Φ, and rank
them from highest to lowest. Finally, we discard all those
subsets that are included in larger subsets having higher Φ
(since they are merely parts of a larger whole). What we
are left with are complexes – individual entities that can
integrate information. Specifically, a complex is a subset S
having Φ>0 that is not included within a larger subset hav-
ing higher Φ. For a complex, and only for a complex, it is
appropriate to say that, when it enters a particular state
out if its repertoire, it generates and amount of integrated
information corresponding to its Φ value. Of the com-
plexes that make up a given system, the one with the max-
imum value of Φ(S) is called the main complex (the
maximum is taken over all combinations of m>1 out of n
elements of the system). Some properties of complexes
worth pointing out are, for instance, that a complex can be
causally connected to elements that are not part of it (the
input and output elements of a complex are called ports-in
and ports-out, respectively). Also, the same element can
belong to more than one complex, and complexes can
overlap.
In summary, a system can be analyzed to identify its com-
plexes – those subsets of elements that can integrate infor-
mation, and each complex will have an associated value of
Φ – the amount of information it can integrate (see
Appendix, iv). To the extent that consciousness corre-
sponds to the capacity to integrate information, com-
plexes are the "subjects" of experience, being the locus
where information can be integrated. Since information
can only be integrated within a complex and not outside
its boundaries, consciousness as information integration
is necessarily subjective, private, and related to a single
point of view or perspective [1,9]. It follows that elements
that are part of a complex contribute to its conscious expe-
rience, while elements that are not part of it do not, even
though they may be connected to it and exchange infor-
mation with it through ports-in and ports-out.
Information integration over space and time
The Φ value of a complex is dependent on both spatial
and temporal scales that determine what counts as a state
of the underlying system. In general, there will be a "grain
size", in both space and time, at which Φ reaches a maxi-
mum. In the brain, for example, synchronous firing of
heavily interconnected groups of neurons sharing inputs
and outputs, such as cortical minicolumns, may produce
significant effects in the rest of the brain, while asynchro-
nous firing of various combinations of individual neurons
may be less effective. Thus, Φ values may be higher when
considering as elements cortical minicolumns rather than
individual neurons, even if their number is lower. On the
other hand, Φ values would be extremely low with ele-
ments the size of brain areas. Time wise, Φ values in the
brain are likely to show a maximum between tens and
hundreds of milliseconds. It is clear, for example, that if
one were to stimulate one half of the brain by inducing
many different firing patterns, and examine what effects
this produces on the other half, no stimulation pattern
would produce any effect whatsoever after just a tenth of
a millisecond, and Φ would be equal to zero. After say 100
milliseconds, however, there is enough time for differen-
tial effects to be manifested, and Φ would grow. On the
other hand, given the duration of conduction delays and
of postsynaptic currents, much longer intervals are not
going to increase Φ values. Indeed, a neural system will
soon settle down into states that become progressively
more independent of the stimulation. Thus, the search for
complexes of maximum Φ should occur over subsets at
critical spatial and temporal scales.
To recapitulate, the theory claims that consciousness cor-
responds to the capacity to integrate information. This
capacity, corresponding to the quantity of consciousness,
is given by the Φ value of a complex. Φ is the amount of
effective information that can be exchanged across the
minimum information bipartition of a complex. A com-
plex is a subset of elements with Φ>0 and with no inclu-
sive subset of higher Φ. The spatial and temporal scales
defining the elements of a complex and the time course of
their interactions are those that jointly maximize Φ.
The second problem: What determines the kind of 
consciousness a system has?
Even if we were reasonably sure that a system is conscious,
it is not immediately obvious what kind of consciousness
it would have. As was mentioned early on, our own con-
sciousness comes in specific and seemingly irreducible
qualities, exemplified by different modalities (e.g. vision,
audition, pain), submodalities (e.g. visual color and
motion), and dimensions (e.g. blue and red). What deter-
mines that colors look the way they do, and different from
the way music sounds, or pain feels? And why can we not
even imagine what a "sixth" sense would feel like? Or con-
sider the conscious experience of others. Does a gifted
musician experience the sound of an orchestra the same
way you do, or is his experience richer? And what about
bats [10]? Assuming that they are conscious, how do they
experience the world they sense through echolocation? Is
their experience of the world vision-like, audition-like, or
completely alien to us? Unless we accept that the kind of
consciousness a system has is arbitrary, there must be
some necessary and sufficient conditions that determineBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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exactly what kind of experiences it can have. This is the
second problem of consciousness.
While it may not be obvious how best to address this
problem, we do know that, just as the quantity of our con-
sciousness depends on the proper functioning of a physi-
cal substrate – the brain, so does the quality of
consciousness. Consider for example the acquisition of
new discriminatory abilities, such as becoming expert at
wine tasting. Careful studies have shown that we do not
learn to distinguish among a large number of different
wines merely by attaching the appropriate labels to differ-
ent sensations that we had had all along. Rather, it seems
that we actually enlarge and refine the set of sensations
triggered by tasting wines. Similar observations have been
made by people who, for professional reasons, learn to
discriminate among perfumes, colors, sounds, tactile sen-
sations, and so on. Or consider perceptual learning during
development. While infants experience more than just a
"buzzing confusion", there is no doubt that perceptual
abilities undergo considerable refinement – just consider
what your favorite red wine must have tasted like when all
you had experienced was milk and water.
These examples indicate that the quality and repertoire of
our conscious experience can change as a result of learn-
ing. What matters here is that such perceptual learning
depends upon specific changes in the physical substrate of
our consciousness – notably a refinement and rearranging
of connections patterns among neurons in appropriate
parts of the thalamocortical system (e.g [11]). Further evi-
dence for a strict association between the quality of con-
scious experience and brain organization comes from
countless neurological studies. Thus, we know that dam-
age to certain parts of the cerebral cortex forever elimi-
nates our ability to perceive visual motion, while leaving
the rest of our consciousness seemingly intact. By contrast,
damage to other parts selectively eliminates our ability to
perceive colors. [12]. There is obviously something about
the organization of those cortical areas that makes them
contribute different qualities – visual motion and color –
to conscious experience. In this regard, it is especially
important that the same cortical lesion that eliminates the
ability to perceive color or motion also eliminates the
ability to remember, imagine, and dream in color or
motion. By contrast, lesions of the retina, while making us
blind, do not prevent us from remembering, imagining,
and dreaming in color (unless they are congenital). Thus,
it is something having to do with the organization of cer-
tain cortical areas – and not with their inputs from the
sensory periphery – that determines the quality of con-
scious experiences we can have. What is this something?
Characterizing the quality of consciousness as a space of 
informational relationships: The effective information matrix
According to the theory, just as the quantity of conscious-
ness associated with a complex is determined by the
amount of information that can be integrated among its
elements, the quality of its consciousness is determined
by the informational relationships that causally link its
elements [13]. That is, the way information can be inte-
grated within a complex determines not only how much
consciousness is has, but also what kind of consciousness.
More precisely, the theory claims that the elements of a
complex constitute the dimensions of an abstract rela-
tional space, the qualia space. The values of effective infor-
mation among the elements of a complex, by defining the
relationships among these dimensions, specify the struc-
ture of this space (in a simplified, Cartesian analogue,
each element is a Cartesian axis, and the effective informa-
tion values between elements define the angles between
the axes, see Appendix, v). This relational space is suffi-
cient to specify the quality of conscious experience. Thus,
the reason why certain cortical areas contribute to con-
scious experience of color and other parts to that of visual
motion has to do with differences in the informational
relationships both within each area and between each area
and the rest of the main complex. By contrast, the infor-
mational relationships that exist outside the main com-
plex – including those involving sensory afferents – do
not contribute either to the quantity or to the quality of
consciousness.
To exemplify, consider two very simple linear systems of
four elements each (Fig. 2). Fig. 2a shows the diagram of
causal interactions for the two systems. The system on the
left is organized as a divergent digraph: element number 1
sends connections of equal strength to the other three ele-
ments. The analysis of complexes shows that this system
forms a single complex having a Φ value of 10 bits. The
system on the right is organized as a chain: element
number 1 is connected to 2, which is connected to 3,
which is connected to 4. This system also constitutes a sin-
gle complex having a Φ value of 10 bits. Fig. 2b shows the
effective information matrix for both complexes. This
contains the values of EI between each subset of elements
and every other subset, corresponding to all informa-
tional relationships among the elements (the first row
shows the values in one direction, the second row in the
reciprocal direction). The elements themselves define the
dimensions of the qualia space of each complex, in this
case four. The effective information matrix defines the
relational structure of the space. This can be thought of as
a kind of topology, in that the entries in the matrix can be
considered to represent how close such dimensions are to
each other (see Appendix, vi). It is apparent that, despite
the identical value of Φ and the same number of dimen-
sions, the informational relationships that define theBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Effective information matrix and activity states for two complexes having the same value of Φ Figure 2
Effective information matrix and activity states for two complexes having the same value of Φ. a. Causal interac-
tions diagram and analysis of complexes. Shown are two systems, one with a "divergent" architecture (left) and one with a "chain" 
architecture (right). The analysis of complexes shows that both contain a complex of four elements having a Φ value of 10. b. 
Effective information matrix. Shown is the effective information matrix for the two complexes above. For each complex, all bipar-
titions are indicated by listing one part (subset A) on the upper row and the complementary part (subset B) on the lower row. 
In between are the values of effective information from A to B and from B to A for each bipartition, color-coded as black 
(zero), red (intermediate value) and yellow (high value). Note that the effective information matrix is different for the two 
complexes, even though Φ is the same. The effective information matrix defines the set of informational relationships, or 
"qualia space" for each complex. Note that the effective information matrix refers exclusively to the informational relationships 
within the main complex (relationships with elements outside the main complex, represented here by empty circles, do not 
contribute to qualia space). c. State diagram. Shown are five representative states for the two complexes. Each is represented 
by the activity state of the four elements of each complex arranged in a column (blue: active elements; black: inactive ones). 
The five states can be thought of, for instance, as evolving in time due the intrinsic dynamics of the system or to inputs from 
the environment. Although the states are identical for the two complexes, their meaning is different because of the difference 
in the effective information matrix. The last four columns represent four special states, those corresponding to the activation 
of one element at a time. Such states, if achievable, would correspond most closely to the specific "quale" contributed by that 
particular element in that particular complex.BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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space are different for the two complexes. For example,
the divergent complex has many more zero entries, while
the chain complex has one entry (subset {1 3} to subset
{2 4}) that is twice as strong as all other non-zero entries.
These two examples are purely meant to illustrate how the
space of informational relationships within a complex can
be captured by the effective information matrix, and how
that space can differ for two complexes having similar
amounts of Φ and the same number of dimensions. Of
course, for a complex having high values of Φ, such as the
one underlying our own consciousness, qualia space
would be extraordinarily large and intricately structured.
Nevertheless, it is a central claim of the theory that the
structure of phenomenological relationships should
reflect directly that of informational relationships. For
example, the conscious experiences of blue and red
appear irreducible (red is not simply less of blue). They
may therefore correspond to different dimensions of
qualia space (different elements of the complex). We also
know that, as different as blue and red may be subjec-
tively, they are much closer to each other than they are,
say, to the blaring of a trumpet. EI values between the neu-
ronal groups underlying the respective dimensions
should behave accordingly, being higher between visual
elements than between visual and auditory elements. As
to the specific quality of different modalities and submo-
dalities, the theory predicts that they are due to differences
in the set of informational relationships within the respec-
tive cortical areas and between each area and the rest of the
main complex. For example, areas that are organized top-
ographically and areas that are organized according to a
"winner takes all" arrangement should contribute differ-
ent kinds of experiences. Another prediction is that
changes in the quality and repertoire of sensations as a
result of perceptual learning would also correspond to a
refinement of the informational relationships within and
between the appropriate cortical areas belonging to the
main complex. By contrast, the theory predicts that infor-
mational relationships outside a complex – including
those among sensory afferents – should not contribute
directly to the quality of conscious experience of that com-
plex. Of course, sensory afferents, sensory organs, and
ultimately the nature and statistics of external stimuli,
play an essential role in shaping the informational rela-
tionships among the elements of the main complex – but
such role is an indirect and historical one – played out
through evolution, development, and learning [14] (see
Appendix, vii).
Specifying each conscious experience: The state of the interaction 
variables
According to the theory, once the quantity and quality of
conscious experience that a complex can have are speci-
fied, the particular conscious state or experience that the
complex will have at any given time is specified by the
activity state of its elements at that time (in a Cartesian
analogue, if each element of the complex corresponds to
an axis of qualia space, and effective information values
between elements define the angles between the axes
specifying the structure of the space, then the activity state
of each element provides a coordinate along its axis, and
each conscious state is defined by the set of all its coordi-
nates). The relevant activity variables are those that medi-
ate the informational relationships among the elements,
that is, those that mediate effective information. For
example, if the elements are local groups of neurons, then
the relevant variables are their firing patterns over tens to
hundreds of milliseconds.
The state of a complex at different times can be repre-
sented schematically by a state diagram as in Fig. 2c (for
the divergent complex on the left and the chain complex
on the right). Each column in the state diagram shows the
activity values of all elements of a complex (here between
0 and 1). Different conscious states correspond to differ-
ent patterns of activity distributed over all the elements of
a complex, with no contribution from elements outside
the complex. Each conscious state can thus be thought of
as a different point in the multidimensional qualia space
defined by the effective information matrix of a complex
(see Appendix, viii). Therefore, a succession or flow of
conscious states over time can be thought of as a trajectory
of points in qualia space. The state diagram also illustrates
some states that have particular significance (second to
fifth column). These are the states with just one active ele-
ment, and all other elements silent (or active at some
baseline level). It is not clear whether such highly selective
states can be achieved within a large neural complex of
high Φ, such as that one that is postulated to underlie
human consciousness. To the extent that this is possible,
such highly selective states would represent the closest
approximation to experiencing that element's specific
contribution to consciousness – its quality or "quale".
However, because of the differences in the qualia space
between the two complexes, the same state over the four
elements would correspond to different experiences (and
mean different things) for the two complexes. It should
also be emphasized that, in every case, it is the activity
state of all elements of the complex that defines a given
conscious state, and both active and inactive elements
count.
To recapitulate, the theory claims that the quality of con-
sciousness associated with a complex is determined by its
effective information matrix. The effective information
matrix specifies all informational relationships among the
elements of a complex. The values of the variables medi-
ating informational interactions among the elements of aBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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complex specify the particular conscious experience at any
given time.
Testing the hypothesis
Consciousness, information integration, and the brain
Based on a phenomenological analysis, we have argued
that consciousness corresponds to the capacity to inte-
grate information. We have then considered how such
capacity can be measured, and we have developed a theo-
retical framework for consciousness as information inte-
gration. We will now consider several neuroanatomical or
neurophysiological factors that are known to influence
consciousness. After briefly discussing the empirical evi-
dence, we will use simplified computer models to illus-
trate how these neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
factors influence information integration. As we shall see,
the information integration theory not only fits empirical
observations reasonably well, but offers a principled
explanation for them.
Consciousness is generated by a distributed thalamocortical network 
that is at once specialized and integrated
Ancient Greek philosophers disputed whether the seat of
consciousness was in the lungs, in the heart, or in the
brain. The brain's pre-eminence is now undisputed, and
scientists are trying to establish which specific parts of the
brain are important. For example, it is well established
that the spinal cord is not essential for our conscious expe-
rience, as paraplegic individuals with high spinal transac-
tions are fully conscious. Conversely, a well-functioning
thalamocortical system is essential for consciousness [15].
Opinions differ, however, about the contribution of cer-
tain cortical areas [1,16-21]. Studies of comatose or vege-
tative patients indicate that a global loss of consciousness
is usually caused by lesions that impair multiple sectors of
the thalamocortical system, or at least their ability to work
together as a system. [22-24]. By contrast, selective lesions
of individual thalamocortical areas impair different sub-
modalities of conscious experience, such as the perception
of color or of faces [25]. Electrophysiological and imaging
studies also indicate that neural activity that correlates
with conscious experience is widely distributed over the
cortex (e.g [20,26-29]). It would seem, therefore, that the
neural substrate of consciousness is a distributed thalam-
ocortical network, and that there is no single cortical area
where it all comes together (see Appendix, ix).
The fact that consciousness as we know it is generated by
the thalamocortical system fits well with the information
integration theory, since what we know about its organi-
zation appears ideally suited to the integration of infor-
mation. On the information side, the thalamocortical
system comprises a large number of elements that are
functionally specialized, becoming activated in different
circumstances. [12,30]. Thus, the cerebral cortex is subdi-
vided into systems dealing with different functions, such
as vision, audition, motor control, planning, and many
others. Each system in turn is subdivided into specialized
areas, for example different visual areas are activated by
shape, color, and motion. Within an area, different groups
of neurons are further specialized, e.g. by responding to
different directions of motion. On the integration side,
the specialized elements of the thalamocortical system are
linked by an extended network of intra- and inter-areal
connections that permit rapid and effective interactions
within and between areas [31-35]. In this way, thalamo-
cortical neuronal groups are kept ready to respond, at
multiple spatial and temporal scales, to activity changes in
nearby and distant thalamocortical areas. As suggested by
the regular finding of neurons showing multimodal
responses that change depending on the context [36,37],
the capacity of the thalamocortical system to integrate
information is probably greatly enhanced by nonlinear
switching mechanisms, such as gain modulation or syn-
chronization, that can modify mappings between brain
areas dynamically [34,38-40]. In summary, the thalamo-
cortical system is organized in a way that appears to
emphasize at once both functional specialization and
functional integration.
As shown by computer simulations, systems of neural ele-
ments whose connectivity jointly satisfies the require-
ments for functional specialization and for functional
integration are well suited to integrating information. Fig.
3a shows a representative connection matrix obtained by
optimizing for Φ starting from random connection
weights. A graph-theoretical analysis indicates that con-
nection matrices yielding the highest values of informa-
tion integration (Φ = 74 bits) share two key characteristics
[8]. First, connection patterns are different for different
elements, ensuring functional specialization. Second, all
elements can be reached from all other elements of the
network, ensuring functional integration. Thus, simulated
systems having maximum Φ appear to require both func-
tional specialization and functional integration. In fact, if
functional specialization is lost by replacing the heteroge-
neous connectivity with a homogeneous one, or if func-
tional integration is lost by rearranging the connections to
form small modules, the value of Φ decreases considera-
bly (Fig 3b,3c). Further simulations show that it is possi-
ble to construct a large complex of high Φ by joining
smaller complexes through reciprocal connections [8]. In
the thalamocortical system, reciprocal connections link-
ing topographically organized areas may be especially
effective with respect to information integration. In sum-
mary, the coexistence of functional specialization and
functional integration, epitomized by the thalamocortical
system [30], is associated with high values of Φ.BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Other brain regions with comparable numbers of neurons, such as 
the cerebellum, do not contribute to conscious experience
Consider now the cerebellum. This brain region contains
more neurons than the cerebral cortex, has huge numbers
of synapses, and receives mapped inputs from the envi-
ronment and controls several outputs. However, in strik-
ing contrast to the thalamocortical system, lesions or
ablations indicate that the direct contribution of the cere-
bellum to conscious experience is minimal. Why is this
the case?
According to the theory, the reason lies with the organiza-
tion of cerebellar connections, which is radically different
from that of the thalamocortical system and is not well
suited to information integration. Specifically, the organ-
ization of the connections is such that individual patches
of cerebellar cortex tend to be activated independently of
one another, with little interaction possible between dis-
tant patches [41,42]. This suggests that cerebellar connec-
tions may not be organized so as to generate a large
complex of high Φ, but rather to give rise to many small
complexes each with a low value of Φ. Such an organiza-
tion seems to be highly suited for both the learning and
the rapid, effortless execution of informationally insu-
lated subroutines.
This concept is illustrated in Fig. 4a, which shows a
strongly modular network, consisting of three modules of
eight strongly interconnected elements each. This network
yields Φ = 20 bits for each of its three modules, which
form the system's three complexes. This example indicates
that, irrespective of how many elements and connections
are present in a neural structure, if that structure is organ-
ized in a strongly modular manner with little interactions
among modules, complex size and Φ values are
necessarily low. According to the information integration
theory, this is the reason why these systems, although
computationally very sophisticated, contribute little to
consciousness. It is also the reason why there is no con-
scious experience associated with hypothalamic and
brainstem circuits that regulate important physiological
variables, such as blood pressure.
Subcortical centers can control consciousness by modulating the 
readiness of the thalamocortical system without contributing directly 
to it
It has been known for a long time that lesions in the retic-
ular formation of the brainstem can produce uncon-
sciousness and coma. Conversely, stimulating the
reticular formation can arouse a comatose animal and
activate the thalamocortical system, making it ready to
respond to stimuli [43]. Groups of neurons within the
reticular formation are characterized by diffuse projec-
tions to many areas of the brain. Many such groups release
neuromodulators such as acetylcholine, histamine,
Information integration for a thalamocortical-like  architecture Figure 3
Information integration for a thalamocortical-like 
architecture. a. Optimization of information integration for a 
system that is both functionally specialized and functionally inte-
grated. Shown is the causal interaction diagram for a network 
whose connection matrix was obtained by optimization for 
Φ (Φ = 74 bits). Note the heterogeneous arrangement of the 
incoming and outgoing connections: each element is con-
nected to a different subset of elements, with different 
weights. Further analysis indicates that this network jointly 
maximizes functional specialization and functional integration 
among its 8 elements, thereby resembling the anatomical 
organization of the thalamocortical system [8]. b. Reduction of 
information integration through loss of specialization. The same 
amount of connectivity, distributed homogeneously to elimi-
nate functional specialization, yields a complex with much 
lower values of Φ (Φ = 20 bits). c. Reduction of information 
integration through loss of integration. The same amount of con-
nectivity, distributed in such a way as to form four independ-
ent modules to eliminate functional integration, yields four 
separate complexes with much lower values of Φ (Φ = 20 
bits).BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Information integration and complexes for other neural-like architectures Figure 4
Information integration and complexes for other neural-like architectures. a. Schematic of a cerebellum-like organiza-
tion. Shown are three modules of eight elements each, with many feed forward and lateral connections within each module but 
minimal connections among them. The analysis of complexes reveals three separate complexes with low values of Φ (Φ = 20 
bits). There is also a large complex encompassing all the elements, but its Φ value is extremely low (Φ = 5 bits). b. Schematic of 
the organization of a reticular activating system. Shown is a single subcortical "reticular" element providing common input to the 
eight elements of a thalamocortical-like main complex (both specialized and integrated, Φ = 61 bits). Despite the diffuse projec-
tions from the reticular element on the main complex, the complex comprising all 9 elements has a much lower value of Φ (Φ 
= 10 bits). c. Schematic of the organization of afferent pathways. Shown are three short chains that stand for afferent pathways. 
Each chain connects to a port-in of a main complex having a high value of Φ (61 bits) that is thalamocortical-like (both special-
ized and integrated). Note that the afferent pathways and the elements of the main complex together constitute a large com-
plex, but its Φ value is low (Φ = 10 bits). Thus, elements in afferent pathways can affect the main complex without belonging to 
it. d. Schematic of the organization of efferent pathways. Shown are three short chains that stand for efferent pathways. Each chain 
receives a connection from a port-out of the thalamocortical-like main complex. Also in this case, the efferent pathways and 
the elements of the main complex together constitute a large complex, but its Φ value is low (Φ = 10 bits). e. Schematic of the 
organization of cortico-subcortico-cortical loops. Shown are three short chains that stand for cortico-subcortico-cortical loops, 
which are connected to the main complex at both ports-in and ports-out. Again, the subcortical loops and the elements of the 
main complex together constitute a large complex, but its Φ value is low (Φ = 10 bits). Thus, elements in loops connected to 
the main complex can affect it without belonging to it. Note, however, that the addition of these three loops slightly increased 
the Φ value of the main complex (from Φ = 61 to Φ = 63 bits) by providing additional pathways for interactions among its 
elements.BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
Page 13 of 22
(page number not for citation purposes)
noradrenaline, serotonin, dopamine, and glutamate (act-
ing on metabotropic receptors) and can have extremely
widespread effects on both neural excitability and plastic-
ity [44]. However, it would seem that the reticular
formation, while necessary for the normal functioning of
the thalamocortical system and therefore for the occur-
rence of conscious experience, may not contribute much
in terms of specific dimensions of consciousness – it may
work mostly like an external on-switch or as a transient
booster of thalamocortical firing.
Such a role can be explained readily in terms of informa-
tion integration. As shown in Fig. 4b, neural elements that
have widespread and effective connections to a main com-
plex of high Φ may nevertheless remain informationally
excluded from it. Instead, they are part of a larger complex
having a much lower value of Φ.
Neural activity in sensory afferents to the thalamocortical system can 
determine what we experience without contributing directly to it
What we see usually depends on the activity patterns that
occur in the retina and that are relayed to the brain. How-
ever, many observations suggest that retinal activity does
not contribute directly to conscious experience. Retinal
cells surely can tell light from dark and convey that infor-
mation to visual cortex, but their rapidly shifting firing
patterns do not correspond well with what we perceive.
For example, during blinks and eye movements retinal
activity changes dramatically, but visual perception does
not. The retina has a blind spot at the exit of the optic
nerve where there are no photoreceptors, and it has low
spatial resolution and no color sensitivity at the periphery
of the visual field, but we are not aware of any of this.
More importantly, lesioning the retina does not prevent
conscious visual experiences. For example, a person who
becomes retinally blind as an adult continues to have
vivid visual images and dreams. Conversely, stimulating
the retina during sleep by keeping the eyes open and pre-
senting various visual inputs does not yield any visual
experience and does not affect visual dreams. Why is it
that retinal activity usually determines what we see
through its action on thalamocortical circuits, but does
not contribute directly to conscious experience?
As shown in Fig. 4c, adding or removing multiple, segre-
gated incoming pathways does not change the composi-
tion of the main complex, and causes little change in its Φ.
While the incoming pathways do participate in a larger
complex together with the elements of the main complex,
the Φ value of this larger complex is very low, being lim-
ited by the effective information between each afferent
pathway and its port in at the main complex. Thus, input
pathways providing powerful inputs to a complex add
nothing to the information it integrates if their effects are
entirely accounted for by ports-in.
Neural activity in motor efferents from the thalamocortical system, 
while producing varied behavioral outputs, does not contribute 
directly to conscious experience
In neurological practice, as well as in everyday life, we
tend to associate consciousness with the presence of a
diverse behavioral repertoire. For example, if we ask a lot
of different questions and for each of them we obtain an
appropriate answer, we generally infer that a person is
conscious. Such a criterion is not unreasonable in terms of
information integration, given that a wide behavioral rep-
ertoire is usually indicative of a large repertoire of internal
states that are available to an integrated system. However,
it appears that neural activity in motor pathways, which is
necessary to bring about such diverse behavioral
responses, does not in itself contribute to consciousness.
For example, patients with the locked-in syndrome, who
are completely paralyzed except for the ability to gaze
upwards, are fully conscious. Similarly, while we are com-
pletely paralyzed during dreams, consciousness is not
impaired by the absence of behavior. Even lesions of cen-
tral motor areas do not impair consciousness.
Why is it that neurons in motor pathways, which can pro-
duce a large repertoire of different outputs and thereby
relay a large amount of information about different con-
scious states, do not contribute directly to consciousness?
As shown in Fig. 4d, adding or removing multiple, segre-
gated outgoing pathways to a main complex does not
change the composition of the main complex, and does
not change its Φ value. Like incoming pathways, outgoing
pathways do participate in a larger complex together with
the elements of the main complex, but the Φ value of this
larger complex is very low, being limited by the effective
information between each port-out of the main complex
and its effector targets.
Neural processes in cortico-subcortico-cortical loops, while important 
in the production and sequencing of action, thought, and language, 
do not contribute directly to conscious experience
Another set of neural structures that may not contribute
directly to conscious experience are subcortical structures
such as the basal ganglia. The basal ganglia are large nuclei
that contain many circuits arranged in parallel, some
implicated in motor and oculomotor control, others, such
as the dorsolateral prefrontal circuit, in cognitive func-
tions, and others, such as the lateral orbitofrontal and
anterior cingulate circuits, in social behavior, motivation,
and emotion [45]. Each basal ganglia circuit originates in
layer V of the cortex, and through a last step in the thala-
mus, returns to the cortex, not far from where the circuit
started [46]. Similarly arranged cortico-ponto-cerebello-
thalamo-cortical loops also exist. Why is it that these com-
plicated neural structures, which are tightly connected to
the thalamocortical system at both ends, do not seem toBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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provide much direct contribution to conscious experi-
ence? (see Appendix, x)
As shown in Fig. 4e, the addition of many parallel cycles
also generally does not change the composition of the
main complex, although Φ values can be altered (see
Appendix, xi). Instead, the elements of the main complex
and of the connected cycles form a joint complex that can
only integrate the limited amount of information
exchanged within each cycle. Thus, subcortical cycles or
loops implement specialized subroutines that are capable
of influencing the states of the main thalamocortical com-
plex without joining it. Such informationally insulated
cortico-subcortical loops could constitute the neural sub-
strates for many unconscious processes that can affect and
be affected by conscious experience [3,47]. It is likely that
new informationally insulated loops can be created
through learning and repetition. For example, when first
performing a new task, we are conscious of every detail of
it, we make mistakes, are slow, and must make an effort.
When we have learned the task well, we perform it better,
faster, and with less effort, but we are also less aware of it.
As suggested by imaging results, a large number of neocor-
tical regions are involved when we first perform a task.
With practice, activation is reduced or shifts to different
circuits [48]. According to the theory, during the early tri-
als, performing the task involves many regions of the
main complex, while later certain aspects of the task are
delegated to neural circuits, including subcortical ones,
that are informationally insulated.
Many neural processes within the thalamocortical system may also 
influence conscious experience without contributing directly to it
Even within the thalamocortical system proper, a substan-
tial proportion of neural activity does not appear to con-
tribute directly to conscious experience. For example,
what we see and hear requires elaborate computational
processes dealing with figure-ground segregation, depth
perception, object recognition, and language parsing,
many of which take place in the thalamocortical system.
Yet we are not aware of all this diligent buzzing: we just see
objects, separated from the background and laid out in
space, and know what they are, or hear words, nicely sep-
arated from each other, and know what they mean. As an
example, take binocular rivalry, where the two eyes view
two different images, but we perceive consciously just one
image at a time, alternating in sequence. Recordings in
monkeys have shown that the activity of visual neurons in
certain cortical areas, such as the inferotemporal cortex,
follows faithfully what the subject perceives consciously.
However, in other areas, such as primary visual cortex,
there are many neurons that respond to the stimulus pre-
sented to the eye, whether or not the subject is perceiving
it [49]. Neuromagnetic studies in humans have shown
that neural activity correlated with a stimulus that is not
being consciously perceived can be recorded in many cor-
tical areas, including the front of the brain. [26]. Why does
the firing of many cortical neurons carrying out the com-
putational processes that enable object recognition (or
language parsing) not correspond to anything conscious?
The situation is similar on the executive side of conscious-
ness. When we plan to do or say something, we are
vaguely conscious of what we intend, and presumably
these intentions are reflected in specific firing patterns of
certain neuronal groups. Our vague intentions are then
translated almost miraculously into the right words, and
strung together to form a syntactically correct sentence
that conveys what we meant to say. And yet again, we are
not at all conscious of the complicated processing that is
needed to carry out our intentions, much of which takes
place in the cortex. What determines whether the firing of
neurons within the thalamocortical system contributes
directly to consciousness or not? According to the infor-
mation integration theory, the same considerations that
apply to input and output circuits and to cortico-subcor-
tico-cortical loops also apply to circuits and loops con-
tained entirely within the thalamocortical system. Thus,
the theory predicts that activity within certain cortical cir-
cuits does not contribute to consciousness because such
circuits implement informationally insulated loops that
remain outside of the main thalamocortical complex. At
this stage, however, it is hard to say precisely which corti-
cal circuits may be informationally insulated. Are primary
sensory cortices organized like massive afferent pathways
to a main complex "higher up" in the cortical hierarchy?
Is much of prefrontal cortex organized like a massive effer-
ent pathway? Do certain cortical areas, such as those
belonging to the dorsal visual stream, remain partly segre-
gated from the main complex? Do interactions within a
cortico-thalamic minicolumn qualify as intrinsic mini-
loops that support the main complex without being part
of it? Unfortunately, answering these questions and prop-
erly testing the predictions of the theory requires a much
better understanding of cortical neuroanatomy than is
presently available [50,51].
Consciousness can be split if the thalamocortical system is split
Studies of split-brain patients, whose corpus callosum was
sectioned for therapeutic reasons, show that each hemi-
sphere has its own, private conscious experience. The
dominant, linguistically competent hemisphere does not
seem to suffer a major impairment of consciousness after
the operation. The non-dominant hemisphere, although
it loses some important abilities and its residual capacities
are harder to assess, also appears to be conscious. [5].
Some information, e.g. emotional arousal, seems to be
shared across the hemispheres, probably thanks to sub-
cortical common inputs.BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Viewing consciousness as information integration sug-
gests straightforward explanations for these puzzling
observations. Consider the simplified model in Fig. 5a. A
main complex having high Φ includes two sets of ele-
ments ("hemispheres") having similar internal architec-
ture that are joined by "callosal" connections (top panel).
When the callosal connections are cut (bottom panel), the
single main complex splits and is replaced by two smaller
complexes corresponding to the two hemispheres. There
is also a complex, of much lower Φ, which includes both
hemispheres and a "subcortical" element that provide
them with common input. Thus, there is a sense in which
the two hemispheres still form an integrated entity, but
the information they share is minimal (see Appendix, xii).
Some parts of the thalamocortical system may contribute to 
conscious experience at one time and not at another
Until now, we have considered structural aspects of the
organization of the nervous system that, according to the
information integration theory, explain why certain parts
of the brain contribute directly to consciousness and oth-
ers do not, or much less so. In addition to neuroanatomi-
cal factors, neurophysiological factors are also important
in determining to what extent a given neural structure can
integrate information. For example, anatomical connec-
tions between brain regions may or may not be func-
tional, depending on both pathological or physiological
factors. Functional disconnections between certain parts
of the brain and others are thought to play a role in psy-
chiatric conversion and dissociative disorders, may occur
during dreaming, and may be implicated in conditions
such as hypnosis. Thus, functional disconnections, just
like anatomical disconnections, may lead to a restriction
of the neural substrate of consciousness.
It is also likely that certain attentional phenomena may
correspond to changes in the neural substrate of con-
sciousness. For example, when one is absorbed in
thought, or focused exclusively on a given sensory modal-
ity, such as vision, the neural substrate of consciousness
may not be the same as when we are diffusely monitoring
the environment. Phenomena such as the attentional
blink, where a fixed sensory input may at times make it to
consciousness and at times not, may also be due to
changes in functional connectivity: access to the main tha-
lamocortical complex may be enabled or not based on
dynamics intrinsic to the complex [52]. Phenomena such
as binocular rivalry may also be related, at least in part, to
dynamic changes in the composition of the main thalam-
ocortical complex caused by transient changes in func-
tional connectivity [53]. At present, however, it is still not
easy to determine whether a particular group of neurons
is excluded from the main complex because of hard-wired
anatomical constraints, or is transiently disconnected due
to functional changes.
Figure 5b (top panel) shows a simple model obtained by
taking three subsets of elements of (relatively) high Φ and
connecting them through reciprocal connections. Specifi-
cally, the first subset, which stands for supramodal areas
of the brain, is reciprocally connected to the second and
third subsets, which stand for visual and auditory areas,
respectively. In this idealized example, the visual and
auditory subsets are not connected directly among them-
selves. As one can see, the three subsets thus connected
form a single main complex having a Φ value of 61 bits.
In the bottom panel, the auditory subset has been discon-
nected, in a functional sense, by mimicking a profound
deactivation of its elements. The result is that the main
complex shrinks and the auditory subset ends up outside
the main complex. Note, however, that in this particular
case the value of Φ changes very little (57 bits), indicating
that it might be possible for the borders of the main com-
plex to change dynamically while the amount of con-
sciousness is not substantially altered. What would
change, of course, would be the configuration of the space
of informational relationships. These simulations suggest
that attentional mechanisms may work both by changing
neuronal firing rates, and therefore saliency within qualia
space, as well as by modifying neuronal readiness to fire,
and therefore the boundaries of the main complex and of
qualia space itself. This is why the set of elements under-
lying consciousness is not static, but can be considered to
form a "dynamic complex" or "dynamic core" [1,9].
Depending on certain neurophysiological parameters, the same 
thalamocortical network can generate much or little conscious 
experience
Another example of the importance of neurophysiological
parameters is provided by sleep – the most familiar of the
alterations of consciousness, and yet one of the most strik-
ing. Upon awakening from dreamless sleep, we have the
peculiar impression that for a while we were not there at
all nor, as far as we are concerned, was the rest of the
world. This everyday observation tells us vividly that con-
sciousness can come and go, grow and shrink. Indeed, if
we did not sleep, it might be hard to imagine that con-
sciousness is not a given, but depends somehow on the
way our brain is functioning. The loss of consciousness
between falling asleep and waking up is relative, rather
than absolute. [54]. Thus, careful studies of mental activ-
ity reported immediately after awakening have shown that
some degree of consciousness is maintained during much
of sleep. Many awakenings, especially from rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep, yield dream reports, and dreams
can be at times as vivid and intensely conscious as waking
experiences. Dream-like consciousness also occurs during
various phases of slow wave sleep, especially at sleep
onset and during the last part of the night. Nevertheless, a
certain proportion of awakenings do not yield any dream
report, suggesting a marked reduction of consciousness.BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Information integration and complexes after anatomical and functional disconnections Figure 5
Information integration and complexes after anatomical and functional disconnections. a. Schematic of a split-brain-
like anatomical disconnection. Top. Shown is a large main complex obtained by connecting two thalamocortical-like subsets 
through "callosum-like" reciprocal connections. There is also a single element that projects to all other elements, representing 
"subcortical" common input. Note that the Φ value for the main complex (16 elements) is high (Φ = 72 bits). There is also a 
larger complex including the "subcortical" element, but its Φ value is low (Φ = 10). Bottom. If the "callosum-like" connections 
are cut, one obtains two 8-element complexes, corresponding to the two "hemispheres", whose Φ value is reduced but still 
high (Φ = 61 bits). The two "hemispheres" still share some information due to common input from the "subcortical" element 
with which they form a large complex of low Φ. b. Schematic of a functional disconnection. Top. Shown is a large main complex 
obtained by linking with reciprocal connections a "supramodal" module of four elements (cornerstone) with a "visual" module 
(to its right) and an "auditory" module (below). Note that there are no direct connections between the "visual" and "auditory" 
modules. The 12 elements together form a main complex with Φ = 61 bits. Bottom. If the "auditory" module is functionally dis-
connected from the "supramodal" one by inactivating its four elements (indicated in blue), the main complex shrinks to include 
just the "supramodal" and "visual" modules. In this case, the Φ value is only minimally reduced (Φ = 57 bits).BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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Such "empty" awakenings typically occur during the deep-
est stages of slow wave sleep (stages 3 and 4), especially
during the first half of the night.
Which neurophysiological parameters are responsible for
the remarkable changes in the quantity and quality of
conscious experience that occur during sleep? We know
for certain that the brain does not simply shut off during
sleep. During REM sleep, for example, neural activity is as
high, if not higher, than during wakefulness, and EEG
recordings show low-voltage fast-activity. This EEG
pattern is known as "activated" because cortical neurons,
being steadily depolarized and close to their firing thresh-
old, are ready to respond to incoming inputs. Given these
similarities, it is perhaps not surprising that consciousness
should be present during both states. Changes in the qual-
ity of consciousness, however, do occur, and they corre-
spond closely to relative changes in the activation of
different brain areas. [54].
During slow wave sleep, average firing rates of cortical
neurons are also similar to those observed during quiet
wakefulness. However, due to changes in the level of cer-
tain neuromodulators, virtually all cortical neurons
engage in slow oscillations at around 1 Hz, which are
reflected in slow waves in the EEG [55]. Slow oscillations
consist of a depolarized phase, during which the mem-
brane potential of cortical neurons is close to firing
threshold and spontaneous firing rates are similar to quiet
wakefulness, and of a hyperpolarized phase, during which
neurons become silent and are further away from firing
threshold. From the perspective of information integra-
tion, a reduction in the readiness to respond to stimuli
during the hyperpolarization phase of the slow oscillation
would imply a reduction of consciousness. It would be as
if we were watching very short fragments of a movie inter-
spersed with repeated unconscious "blanks" in which we
cannot see, think, or remember anything, and therefore
have little to report. A similar kind of unreadiness to
respond, associated with profound hyperpolarization, is
found in deep anesthesia, another condition where con-
sciousness is impaired. Studies using transcranial mag-
netic stimulation in conjunction with high-density EEG
are currently testing how response readiness changes dur-
ing the sleep waking cycle.
From the perspective of information integration, a reduc-
tion of consciousness during certain phases of sleep
would occur even if the brain remained capable of
responding to perturbations, provided its response were
to lack differentiation. This prediction is borne out by
detailed computer models of a portion of the visual tha-
lamocortical system (Hill and Tononi, in preparation).
According to these simulations, in the waking mode dif-
ferent perturbations of the thalamocortical network yield
specific responses. In the sleep mode, instead, the network
becomes bistable: specific effects of different perturba-
tions are quickly washed out and their propagation
impeded: the whole network transitions into the depolar-
ized or into the hyperpolarized phase of the slow oscilla-
tion – a stereotypic response that is observed irrespective
of the particular perturbation (see Appendix, xiii). And of
course, this bistability is also evident in the spontaneous
behavior of the network: during each slow oscillation, cor-
tical neurons are either all firing or all silent, with little
freedom in between. In summary, these simulations
indicate that, even if the anatomical connectivity of a
complex stays the same, a change in key parameters gov-
erning the readiness of neurons to respond and the differ-
entiation of their responses may alter radically the Φ value
of the complex, with corresponding consequences on
consciousness.
Conscious experience and time requirements
Consciousness not only requires a neural substrate with
appropriate anatomical structure and appropriate physio-
logical parameters: it also needs time. As was mentioned
earlier, studies of how a percept is progressively specified
and stabilized indicate that it takes up to 100–200 milli-
seconds to develop a fully formed sensory experience, and
that the surfacing of a conscious thought may take even
longer. Experiments in which the somatosensory areas of
the cerebral cortex were stimulated directly indicate that
low intensity stimuli must be sustained for up to 500
milliseconds to produce a conscious sensation [56].
Multi-unit recordings in the primary visual cortex of mon-
keys show that, after a stimulus is presented, the firing rate
of many neurons increases irrespective of whether the ani-
mal reports seeing a figure or not. After 80–100 millisec-
onds, however, their discharge accurately predicts the
conscious detection of the figure. Thus, the firing of the
same cortical neurons may correlate with consciousness at
certain times, but not at other times [57]. What deter-
mines when the firing of the same cortical neurons con-
tributes to conscious experience and when it does not?
And why may it take up to hundreds of milliseconds
before a conscious experience is generated?
The theory predicts that the time requirements for the gen-
eration of conscious experience in the brain emerge
directly from the time requirements for the build-up of
effective interactions among the elements of the main
complex. As was mentioned above, if one were to perturb
half of the elements of the main complex for less than a
millisecond, no perturbations would produce any effect
on the other half within this time window, and Φ would
be equal to zero. After say 100 milliseconds, however,
there is enough time for differential effects to be mani-
fested, and Φ should grow. This prediction is confirmed
by results obtained using large-scale computerBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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simulations of the thalamocortical system, where the time
course of causal interactions and functional integration
can be studied in detail [38,58,59], Hill and Tononi,
unpublished results). For example, in a model including
nine functionally segregated visual areas, the time it takes
for functionally specialized neurons located in several dif-
ferent areas to interact constructively and produce a spe-
cific, correlated firing pattern is at least 80 milliseconds
[38]. These correlated firing patterns last for several hun-
dred milliseconds. After one or more seconds, however,
the network settles into spontaneous activity states that
are largely independent of previous perturbations. Thus,
the characteristic time scale for maximally differentiated
responses in thalamocortical networks appears to be com-
prised between a few tens of milliseconds and a few sec-
onds at the most.
In summary, the time scale of neurophysiological interac-
tions needed to integrate information among distant cor-
tical regions appears to be consistent with that required by
psychophysical observations (microgenesis), by stimula-
tion experiments, and by recording experiments.
Summary: seeing blue
The previous examples show that the information integra-
tion theory is consistent with several empirical observa-
tions concerning the neural substrate of consciousness.
Moreover, they show that the theory can provide a princi-
pled account of why consciousness is associated with cer-
tain parts of the brain rather than with others, and with
certain global modes of functioning more than with oth-
ers. To recapitulate the main tenets of the theory, it may
be useful to reconsider the initial thought experiment.
Imagine again that you are comfortably facing a blank
screen that is alternately on and off. When the screen turns
on, you see a homogenous blue field, indeed for the sake
of the argument we assume that you are having a "pure"
perception of blue, unencumbered by extraneous percepts
or thoughts (perhaps as can be achieved in certain medi-
tative states). As you have been instructed, you signal your
perception of blue by pushing a button. Now consider an
extremely simplified scenario of the neural events that
might accompany your seeing blue. When the screen turns
on, a volley of activity propagates through the visual affer-
ent pathways, involving successive stages such as retinal
short wavelength cones, blue-yellow opponents cells,
color constant cells, and so on. Eventually, this volley of
activity in the visual afferent pathways leads to the firing
of some neuronal groups in color-selective areas of the
temporal lobe that, on empirical grounds, are our best bet
for the neural correlate of blue: i) their activity correlates
well with your perception of blue whether you see, imag-
ine, or dream blue, in a way that is as stable and as suscep-
tible to illusions as your perception of blue; ii) their
microstimulation leads to the perception of blue; and iii)
their selective lesion makes you unable to perceive blue.
Let us assume, then, that these neuronal groups quickly
increase their firing, and within a few tens of milliseconds
they reach and then maintain increased levels of firing
(see Appendix, xiv). We also assume that, at the same
time, neuronal groups in neighboring cortical areas go on
firing at a baseline level, largely unaffected by the blue
light. These include neuronal groups in other visual areas
that are selective for shape or movement; neuronal groups
in auditory area that are selective for tones; and many
others. On the other hand, the volley of activity originat-
ing in the retina does not exhaust itself by generating sus-
tained activity in the color areas of the temporal lobe. Part
of the volley proceeds at great speed and activates efferent
motor pathways, which cause you to push the signaling
button. Another part activates cortico-subcortico-cortical
loops in your prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia, which
almost make you speak the word "blue" aloud. In the
meantime, many other parts of the brain are buzzing
along, unaffected by what is going on in the visual system:
cerebellar circuits are actively stabilizing your posture and
gaze, and hypothalamic-brainstem circuits are actively sta-
bilizing your blood pressure. What components in this
simplified neural scenario are essential for your conscious
experience of blue, and why?
The information integration theory makes several claims
that lead to associated predictions. A first claim is that the
neural substrate of consciousness as we know it is a com-
plex of high Φ that is capable of integrating a large
amount of information – the main complex. Therefore,
whether a group of neurons contributes directly to con-
sciousness is a function of its belonging to the main com-
plex or not. In this example, the theory would predict that
blue-selective neurons in some high-level color area
should be inside the main complex; on the other hand,
blue-sensitive neurons in afferent visual pathways, neu-
rons in efferent pathways mediating the button-pressing
response, neurons in cortico-subcortico-cortical and intra-
cortical loops mediating subvocalization of the word
"blue", neurons in the cerebellum controlling posture and
neurons in hypothalamic-brainstem circuits controlling
blood pressure should be outside. This even though these
neurons may be equally active when you see blue, and
even though some of them may be connected to elements
of the main complex. In principle, joint microstimulation
and recording experiments, and to some extent an analy-
sis of patterns of synchronization, could determine partic-
ipation in the main complex and test this prediction. The
theory also predicts that blue-selective neurons in the
main complex contribute to the conscious experience of
blue only if their activation is sufficiently strong or sus-
tained that they can make a difference, in informational
terms, to the rest of the complex. Additional predictionsBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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are that, if a group of neurons that is normally part of the
main complex becomes informationally disconnected
from it, as could occur through attentional effects or in
certain phases of sleep, the same group of neurons, firing
in exactly the same way, would not contribute to con-
sciousness. Moreover, according to the theory, the other
groups of neurons within the main complex are essential
to our conscious experience of blue even if, as in this
example, they are not activated. This is not difficult to see.
Imagine that, starting from an intact main complex, we
were to remove one element after another, except for the
active, blue-selective one. If an inactive element contribut-
ing to "seeing red" were removed, blue would not be expe-
rienced as blue anymore, but as some less differentiated
color, perhaps not unlike those experienced by certain
dichromats. If further elements of the main complex were
removed, including those contributing to shapes, to
sounds, to thoughts and so forth, one would soon drop to
such a low level of consciousness that "seeing blue" would
become meaningless: the "feeling" (and meaning) of the
quale "blue" would have been eroded down to nothing.
Indeed, while the remaining neural circuits may still be
able to discriminate blue from other colors, they would
do so very much as a photodiode does (see Appendix, xv).
A second claim of the theory is that the quality of con-
sciousness is determined by the informational relation-
ships within the main complex. Therefore, how a group of
neurons contributes to consciousness is a function of its
informational relationships inside the complex and not
outside of it. In this example, blue-selective neurons
within the main complex have become blue-selective no
doubt thanks to the inputs received from the appropriate
afferent pathways, and ultimately because of some aspects
of the statistics of the environment and the resulting plas-
tic changes throughout the brain. However, the theory
predicts that their present firing contributes the quale
"blue" exclusively because of their informational relation-
ships within the main complex. If connections outside the
main complex were to be manipulated, including the
afferent color pathways, the experience elicited by activat-
ing the blue-selective neurons within the complex would
stay the same. Conversely, if the relationships inside the
main complex were to change, as could be done by chang-
ing the pattern of connections within the color-selective
area and with the rest of the complex, so would the con-
scious experience of blue. That is, activating the same neu-
rons would produce a different conscious experience.
Implications of the hypothesis
To conclude, it is worth mentioning some of the implica-
tions that derive from the information integration theory
of consciousness. At the most general level, the theory has
ontological implications. It takes its start from phenome-
nology and, by making a critical use of thought
experiments, it argues that subjective experience is one
and the same thing as a system's capacity to integrate
information. In this view, experience, that is, information
integration, is a fundamental quantity, just as mass,
charge or energy are. It follows that any physical system
has subjective experience to the extent that it is capable of
integrating information, irrespective of what it is made of.
Thus, an intriguing implication of the theory is that it
should be possible to construct conscious artifacts by
endowing them with a complex of high Φ. Moreover, it
should be possible to design the quality of their conscious
experience by appropriately structuring their effective
information matrix.
It also follows that consciousness is not an all-or-none
property, but it is graded: to varying degrees, it should
exist in most natural (and artificial) systems. Because the
conditions needed to build complexes of high Φ are
apparently not easy to achieve, however, correspondingly
high levels of experience are probably available to only a
few kinds of systems, primarily complex brains containing
the right type of architecture for maximizing functional
specialization and integration. A related implication is
that consciousness should also exist, to varying degrees, at
multiple spatial and temporal scales. However, it is likely
that, in most systems, there are privileged spatial and tem-
poral scales at which information integration reaches a
maximum.
Consciousness is characterized here as a disposition or
potentiality – in this case as the potential differentiation of
a system's responses to all possible perturbations, yet it is
undeniably actual. Consider another thought experiment:
you could be in a coma for days, awaken to consciousness
for just one second, and revert to a coma. As long as your
thalamocortical system can function well for that one sec-
ond, you will be conscious. That is, a system does not have
to explore its repertoire of states to be conscious, or to
know how conscious it is supposed to be: what counts is
only that the repertoire is potentially available. While this
may sound strange, fundamental quantities associated
with physical systems can also be characterized as dispo-
sitions or potentialities, yet have actual effects. For exam-
ple, mass can be characterized as a potentiality – say the
resistance that a body would offer to acceleration by a
force – yet it exerts undeniable effects, such as attracting
other masses. This too has intriguing implications. For
example, because in this view consciousness corresponds
to the potential of an integrated system to enter a large
number of states by way of causal interactions within it,
experience is present as long as such potential is present,
whether or not the system's elements are activated. Thus,
the theory predicts that a brain where no neurons were
activated, but were kept ready to respond in a differenti-
ated manner to different perturbations, would beBMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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conscious (perhaps that nothing was going on). Also,
because consciousness is a property of a system, not of a
state, the state the system is in only determines which par-
ticular experience becomes actual at any given time, and
not whether experience is present. Thus, a brain where
each neuron were microstimulated to fire as an exact rep-
lica of your brain, but where synaptic interactions had
been blocked, would be unconscious.
The theory predicts that consciousness depends exclu-
sively on the ability of a system to integrate information,
whether or not it has a strong sense of self, language, emo-
tion, a body, or is immersed in an environment, contrary
to some common intuitions. This prediction is consistent
with the preservation of consciousness during REM sleep,
when both input and output signals from and to the body
are markedly reduced. Transient inactivation of brain
areas mediating the sense of self, language, and emotion
could assess this prediction in a more cogent manner.
Nevertheless, the theory recognizes that these same factors
are important historically because they favor the develop-
ment of neural circuits forming a main complex of high Φ.
For example, the ability of a system to integrate informa-
tion grows as that system incorporates statistical regulari-
ties from its environment and learns [14]. In this sense,
the emergence of consciousness in biological systems is
predicated on a long evolutionary history, on individual
development, and on experience-dependent change in
neural connectivity. Indeed, the theory also suggests that
consciousness provides an adaptive advantage and may
have evolved precisely because it is identical with the abil-
ity to integrate a lot of information in a short period of
time. If such information is about the environment, the
implication is that, the more an animal is conscious, the
larger the number of variables it can take into account
jointly to guide its behavior.
Another implication of the theory is that the presence and
extent of consciousness can be determined, in principle,
also in cases in which we have no verbal report, such as
infants or animals, or in neurological conditions such as
coma and vegetative states, minimally conscious states,
akinetic mutism, psychomotor seizures, and sleepwalk-
ing. In practice, of course, measuring Φ accurately in such
systems will not be easy, but approximations and
informed guesses are certainly conceivable.
At present, the validity of this theoretical framework and
the plausibility of its implications rest on its ability to
account, in a coherent manner, for some basic phenome-
nological observations and for some elementary but puz-
zling facts about the relationship between consciousness
and the brain. Experimental developments, especially of
ways to stimulate and record concurrently the activity of
broad regions of the brain, should permit stringent tests of
some of the theory's predictions. Equally important will
be the development of realistic, large-scale models of the
anatomical organization of the brain. These models
should allow a more rigorous measurement of how the
capacity to integrate information relates to different brain
structures and certain neurophysiological parameters
[38,50,59]. Finally, the theoretical framework presented
here aims primarily at understanding the necessary and
sufficient conditions that determine the quantity and
quality of consciousness at the most general level. Further
theoretical developments will be required to address sev-
eral issues that are central to the study of consciousness in
a biological and psychological context, such as the rela-
tionship of consciousness to memory and language,
higher order aspects of consciousness [60,61], and its rela-
tionship to the self) [62]. Undoubtedly, a full understand-
ing of how the brain generates human consciousness
remains a formidable task. However, if experimental
investigations can be complemented by a principled the-
oretical approach, it may not lay beyond the reach of
science.
Appendix
i. The problem can also be posed in neural terms. When
we see light, certain neurons in the retina turn on, as do
other neurons higher up in the brain. Based on what we
know, the activity of neurons in the retina is not directly
associated with conscious experience of light and dark –
they behave just like biological photodiodes that signal to
higher centers. Somewhere in those higher centers, how-
ever, there seem to be some neurons whose activity is
indeed tightly correlated with the conscious experience of
light and dark. What is special about these higher
neurons?
ii. Note that this information has nothing to do with how
complicated the scene is, or how many different objects it
appears to contain, but only with the number of alterna-
tive outcomes.
iii. This quantity is also called MIBcomplexity, for minimum
information bipartition complexity. Note that, in most
cases, the bipartitions for which the normalized value of
EI will be at a minimum, everything else being equal, will
be bipartitions that cut the system in two halves, i.e. mid-
partitions [2].
iv. Complexes can also be defined using mutual informa-
tion instead of effective information, by exploiting the
endogenous sources of variance that may exist in an iso-
lated system [8]. A related measure could be constructed
using the formalism of ε-machines [63]. Φ would then be
related to the Hµ of the minimal ε-machine capable of
reproducing the causal structure of a process, i.e. of the ε-BMC Neuroscience 2004, 5:42 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2202/5/42
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machine that cannot be decomposed into a collection of
lower Hµ ε-machines.
v. An elementary description of the qualia space is given
by the author in [9], chapter 13.
vi. While the entries in the matrix contain all the relevant
informational relationships defining this space, they do
not reveal necessarily how the space is organized in an
economical and explicit manner. This may be done by
employing procedures akin to multidimensional scaling
although, since the matrix is asymmetrical and involves
high-order terms (among subsets of elements), this may
not be easy. Satisfactorily mapping the phenomenological
differences between modalities, submodalities and
dimensions onto the structure of qualia space will require
that we thoroughly characterize and understand the latter.
vii. Of course, sensory afferents usually play a role in
determining which particular conscious experience we
have at any given time (they better do so, if experience is
to have an adaptive relationship to the environment).
Nevertheless, particular experiences can be triggered even
when we are disconnected from the environment, as in
dreams.
viii. Note also that a "pure" sensation of blue defines a
point in this N-dimensional qualia space as much as the
experience of a busy city street, full of different objects, of
sounds, smells, associations, and reflections defines
another point.
ix. However, certain areas such as the posterior cingulate
cortex and precuneus, some lateral parietal areas, and
associated paramedian thalamic nuclei, may constitute
strategic crossroads for coordinating the interactions
among different sensory maps and frames of reference
concerning the body and the environment. Bilateral
lesions to such areas may lead to a virtual breakdown of
information integration in the thalamocortical system
[22,24]. A global, persistent disruption of consciousness
can also be produced by focal lesions of paramedian mes-
odiencephalic structures, which include the intralaminar
thalamic nuclei. Most likely, such focal lesions are cata-
strophic because the strategic location and connectivity of
paramedian structures ensure that distributed cortico-tha-
lamic loops can work together as a system. 
x. Statements about the lack of direct contributions to
consciousness of basal ganglia loops need to be qualified
due to the difficulty of evaluating the precise effects of
their selective inactivation, as well as to the unreliability
of introspective assessments about the richness of one's
experience, especially after brain lesions. Similar
considerations apply to brain structures not discussed
here, such as the claustrum, the amygdala, and the basal
forebrain.
xi. A similar kind of analysis could be applied to other
neurological disconnection syndromes.
xii. An explanation in terms of reduced degrees of freedom
may also apply to loss of consciousness in absence and
other seizures, during which neural activity is extremely
high and near-synchronous over many cortical regions
(Tononi, unpublished results).
xiii. While we do not yet have such a tight case for the neu-
ral correlate of blue, we are close to it with motion sensi-
tive cells in area MT and in somatosensory cortex, at least
in monkeys [64].
xv. In this sense, a particular conscious experience, its
meaning, and the underlying informational relationships
within a complex end up being one and the same thing.
Such internalistic, relationally defined meanings generally
relate to and ultimately derive from entities in the world.
To the extent that the brain has a long evolutionary his-
tory and is shaped by experience, it is clear that internally
specified meanings (and conscious states) bear an adap-
tive relationship to what is out there.
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